Abstract-Key update and residence management have been investigated as an effective solution to cope with desynchronization attacks in mobility management entity (MME) handovers. In this paper, we first analyze the impacts of the key update interval (KUI) and MME residence interval (MRI) on handover processes and their secrecy performance in terms of the number of exposed packets (NEP), signaling overhead rate (SOR), and outage probability of vulnerability (OPV). Specifically, the bounds of the derived NEP and SOR not only capture their behaviors at the boundary of the KUI and MRI, but also show the tradeoff between the NEP and SOR. Additionally, through the analysis of the OPV, it is shown that the handover security can be enhanced by shortening the KUI and the desynchronization attacks can be avoided with high-mobility users. The above facts accordingly motivate us to propose a multi-objective optimization (MO) problem to find the optimal KUI and MRI that minimize both the NEP and SOR subject to the constraint on the OPV. To this end, two scalarization techniques are adapted to transform the proposed MO problem into single-objective optimization problems, i.e., an achievement-function method via fractional programming (FP) and a weighted-sum method. Based on the derived bounds on NEP and SOR, the FP approach can be optimally solved via a simple numerical method. For the weighted-sum method, the firefly algorithm (FA) is utilized to find the optimal solution. The results show that both techniques can solve the proposed MO problem with a significantly reduced searching complexity compared to the conventional heuristic iterative search technique.
I. INTRODUCTION
A IMING to provide packet-switched traffic with seamless mobility, high quality of service and minimal latency, handovers play an important role in every cellular communication system. As a recent standard for high data rate com- munication in telecommunications, the 4th Generation (4G) Long-Term Evolution (LTE) supports two types of handovers including intra-LTE and inter-LTE Mobility Management Entity (MME) handovers [1] - [3] . In the intra-MME handover, i.e. when a User Equipment (UE) moves from a source to a target eNodeB within the same MME, the source eNodeB provides the target eNodeB with a new session key to be used after handover. The session keys are used to encrypt messages, i.e. user data and signaling packets, exchanged between a UE and its serving eNodeB [4] . The new key is generated from the current one by either utilizing a one-way function, a.k.a. backward key separation process, or adding fresh materials to the process of generating the new one, a.k.a. forward key separation process. As eNodeBs are exposed to the public locations and the internet-protocol-architecture nature of the network, handover-key management process is vulnerable to attacks deployed by bogus eNodeBs [5] . Such attacks are referred to as desynchronisation attacks [6] which aim to prevent target eNodeBs from adding the fresh materials thus breaking the forward key separation process. Consequently, the attacker can either decipher the communications between a genuine eNodeB and a UE or compromise all future keys between specific UEs and eNodeBs for further active attacks. To prevent desynchronisation attacks, the authors of [7] proposed an approach with double authentication. However, both source and destination nodes are required to generate keys, which causes double signaling overhead. Fortunately, the effects of desynchronisation attacks will be terminated at the next update of the root key when handover key materials are generated from scratch instead of deriving from previous keys [8] . In addition to desynchronisation attacks, Denial-ofService (DoS) attacks, which is beyond the scope of this work, can occur when the UE initiates a detach/attach request during handover to de-register with the old network and re-register with the new one for uninterrupted service. 1 In order to protect against these DoS attacks, an authentication process can be employed for a secure channel between the eNodeB and UE in these phases [10] , [11] .
When an inter-MME handover is carried out for a UE, the root key is automatically updated or regenerated. As a result, all security risks related to the inter-MME handover are eliminated [8] . On the other hand, when an intra-MME handover is performed for the UE, the root key is not updated. In fact, the UE and its serving MME will decide when to regenerate the root key during the residence duration of the UE within that serving MME. Recently, crosslayer-handover approaches, see e.g. [12] , have been proposed utilizing physical-layer parametters such as channel state information (CSI) or received signal strength (RSS) as an encryption key. Due to the nature of wireless environments, UEs with different locations will possess distinguishable CSIs or RSSs hence distinguishable encryption keys. Since the CSI or RSS can only be obtained at the receiver side, such approaches still impose/require overhead/additional channel for exchanging the CSI or RSS between the receiver and its transmitter. Furthermore, it may be possible for attackers to tactically deploy sensors nearby their targeted UEs to attain the UEs' CSIs or RSSs. Clearly, the intra-MME handovers are vulnerable to desynchronisation attacks. Therefore, this paper will focus on tackling the desynchronisation attacks for the intra-MME handovers.
In order to tackle the desynchronisation attacks, in [13] , the author first modeled the reliability of typical cryptographic infrastructures, their related failure rates, the failure tolerance of the cryptographic keys, and the accepted errorbound. Then a framework was introduced to maximize the lifetime of the key while bounding the risk of key exposure in the presence of the aforementioned faults. Determining the root Key Update Interval (KUI) has been identified as an effective solution to tackle the desynchronisation attacks, see e.g. [8] , [13] , [14] . 2 To that end, a mathematical model was developed in [8] to represent the average Number of Exposed Packets (NEP) between two root key updates and the average value of Signaling Overhead Rate (SOR). 3 It was shown that the security of intra-MME handovers can be enhanced by minimizing the NEP so as to eliminate the desynchronisation attacks. However, such NEP's reduction requires a higher SOR which is undesired and even unfeasible in practice. To address this dilemma, the conventional approaches in [8] , [13] , [14] aimed to minimize SOR given a required NEP. In this paper, we consider a different approach to simultaneously minimize both the NEP and SOR. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work addressing the SOR and NEP concurrently where a Multiobjective Optimization (MO) framework [16] , [17] is adopted to capture as well as to find a set of Pareto optimal solutions, i.e. Pareto frontier, for our problem.
Generally, there is no single solution that simultaneously optimizes conflicting objectives in an MO problem. However, there exists a set of Pareto optimal solutions, i.e. Pareto frontier [16] . The most suitable/desirable solution to the designer/decision maker is selected from the Pareto frontier. Methods to obtain the Pareto frontier of an MO problem can be mainly classified into two types, i.e. scalarization approaches and non-scalarization approaches.
In the scalarization approaches, the preferential information about objectives is known in advance, e.g. defined by the designer/decision maker, an MO problem is then converted into a Single-objective Optimization (SO) problem by either optimizing one objective and considering other objectives as constraints, see e.g. -constraint method [18] , [19] , elastic constraint method [20] , [21] , or aggregating all objectives in a single objective, see e.g. weighted sum method [22] , [23] , min-max method [24] , [25] , goal programming [26] - [28] , compromise programming [29] , [30] , and achievement function method (AFM) [31] , [32] . On the other hand, in the non-scalarization approaches, the priority information about objectives is not known in advance. In such case, nature inspired/generic algorithms are usually adopted to generate the Pareto frontier by simultaneously optimizing all objectives. The scalarization approaches attain the Pareto frontier by repeatedly solving several SO problems, each of which is formed with a different value of priorities amongst objectives, while the non-scalarization approaches obtain the Pareto frontier by directly solving the MO problem. However, the non-scalarization approaches require significantly higher computational capacity than the scalarization approaches. Moreover, when the number of objectives increases, the nonscalarization approaches perform worse than the scalarization approaches. In this work, we adopt scalarization approaches to solve our proposed MO problem.
In this paper, we first investigate the impacts of not only KUI but also MME Residence Interval (MRI) on the handover performance in terms of NEP and SOR. In order to evaluate the secrecy performance of the handover mechanism, we also analyze the Outage Probability of Vulnerability (OPV) which is defined as the probability that the handover is at-risk caused by desynchronisation attacks. 4 The derived OPV as well as the bounds of the NEP and SOR facilitate the finding of the optimal KUI and MRI to minimize both the NEP and SOR using various approaches. The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows:
• Upper and lower bounds of NEP and SOR are derived with respect to KUI and MRI. The derived bounds provide insightful meanings of the NEP and SOR expressions. They not only capture the behaviors of the NEP and SOR at the boundary values of the KUI and MRI, but also verify that there exists a trade-off between the NEP and the SOR.
• The OPV is derived as a function of both the KUI and MRI given a vulnerable period threshold. It is shown that the OPV monotonically increases as either the KUI or the MRI increases. This accordingly indicates that the desynchronisation attacks can be eliminated when the MRI lasts for a short time; otherwise, the OPV can be reduced by shortening the KUI to enhance the handover security.
• An MO problem is proposed to find the optimal KUI and MRI that minimize both the NEP and SOR subject to the Fig. 1 . Timing diagram of MME residence with key update and vulnerable attack periods [8] .
constraint on the OPV. Observing the properties of the derived bounds on NEP and SOR motivates us to adopt an achievement function method [16, Definition 4.28 ] to scalarize the proposed MO problem, i.e. transforming the proposed MO problem into an SO problem, as the ratio of the normalized NEP to the normalized SOR. In fact, the transformed SO problem is also a Fractional Programming (FP) problem. Thanks to the derived bounds of the NEP and SOR, the FP problem can be solved via a simple numerical method, which hereafter is referred to as the boundary-based FP. The boundary-based FP can avoid the conventional exhaustive search of the KUI, e.g. in [8] , which in turn reflects the novelty of our work in deriving the aforementioned bounds. Hence, adopting our proposed boundary-based FP approach instead of utilizing the standard method in [8] to tackle desynchronisation attacks in intra-MME handovers 5 results in not only a reduced complexity but also an improved reliability. Furthermore, given a constraint on the maximal OPV, the maximum values of the KUI and MRI can be obtained, which are helpful in verifying the appropriateness of the derived optimal KUI and MRI.
• As a metaheuristic approach, Firefly Algorithm (FA) is adopted as a second approach to solve another scalarized version of the proposed MO problem which is a weighted sum of the normalized NEP and SOR, hereafter it is referred to as the FA approach. The FA approach is shown to provide a quick convergence of the fireflies towards the optimal values after a small number of generations, and thus promising to provide a self-adjusting and adaptive MME handover. The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II describes the system model of a typical MME handover in LTE networks. The bounds of NEP and SOR with respect to KUI and MRI are derived in Section III, followed by the analysis of OPV in Section IV. Sections V and VI sequentially present FP and FA methods for optimizing the KUI and MRI. Numerical and simulation results are presented in Section VII to validate the concepts and findings. Finally, Section VIII draws the main conclusions from this paper. Figure 1 illustrates the timing diagram of an MME residence in a typical LTE network [8] . Consider the following times 5 Our solution is not required for standard inter-MME handover since the root key is automatically updated or regenerated during this process.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
in a chronological order τ 1 , τ 2 , τ 3 and τ 4 . A UE enters an MME area at τ 1 and leaves at τ 4 . An intra-MME handover over X2 interface between eNodeBs is investigated, while the signaling of UE association between eNodeB and the MME is offered via S1 interface [34] . 6 When an intra-MME handover is occurred, a new session key is generated by applying a one-way function to the current session key. In order to prevent irrelevant eNodeBs from deriving a new session key from the current session key, i.e., maintaining the forward-key-separation process, fresh materials are added to the process of creating the key. However, under certain circumstances, handover key management cannot guarantee the forward-key-separation process against variant attacks by bogus eNodeBs [8] , a.k.a. desynchronisation attacks. Fortunately, the desynchronisation attack will be terminated when the root key is updated.
In Fig. 1 , a desynchronisation attack and a root key update requested by the UE are assumed to take place at τ 2 and τ 3 , respectively. 7 As a part of handover preparation, the UE performs measurements of the received signals from the neighboring eNodeBs and sends the measurement reports to the source eNodeB to identify the target cell(s) for handover [36] . During this phase, the uplink and downlink channels for LTE Radio Resource Control (RRC) connection establishment procedure are secured for sharing the measurement reports between the UE and eNodeB, controlling the key sharing, signaling of handover requests, and acknowledgement between eNodeBs.
Let us denote the MRI and KUI by t R and t U , respectively. As shown in Fig. 1 , t R = τ 4 − τ 1 and t U = τ 3 − τ 1 . Furthermore, let t u = τ 3 − τ 2 and t r = τ 4 − τ 2 denote two key exposure intervals with reference to the key update time and the MME exiting time, respectively. The effect of a desynchronisation attack can be eliminated at the time when either updating key or the UE leaves the MME. It is therefore crucial to determine the optimal KUI and MRI to alleviate the desynchronisation attacks. The vulnerable period, denoted by t c , is accordingly determined by
Note that if the desynchronisation attack occurs after the key is updated, i.e. τ 3 ≤ τ 2 , then there is only the second key exposure interval as regards the MME exiting time, and thus t c = t r . In order to model the interval time of key update, following the same approach as in [8] , let us assume that KUI, i.e. t U , 6 Details of mechanism considered for intra-handover over X2 interface can be referred to in [34] where X2 Application Protocol (X2AP) was introduced for the handover process between eNodeBs. Specifically, the mobility management in the X2AP between the master eNodeB (MeNB) and the secondary eNodeB (SeNB) consists of the following elementary procedures: Handover preparation, Sequence number status transfer, UE context release, and Handover cancel. 7 Depending the capacity of the eNodeB, the handover of multiple UEs can be executed simultaneously by grouping them together via group handover as in [35] . In this work, we considered an intra-MME handover of an UE with a desynchronisation attack. The work however can be extended for the case of multiple UE handovers where the desynchronisation attacks at different UEs can be treated individually by utilizing different KUIs correspondingly.
follows an exponential distribution [37] with a rate of μ u . 8 For modeling variant duration and mobility of UEs in various environment, the MRI, i.e. t R , is assumed to follow a gamma distribution [38] which is a general type of statistical distribution with a shape parameter of k and a rate of μ r . 9 Here, μ u and μ r represent the key update rate and mobility rate of UEs, respectively. The average KUI, denoted by T U , and the average MRI, denoted by T R , are thus given by [37] , [38] 
where E[·] denotes the expectation operator. In this work, we aim to find the optimal MRI and KUI, i.e. to decide optimal times to regenerate the root key, to tackle desynchronisation attacks. Key sharing mechanisms are out of the scope of our work. For convenience, the main notations used in the paper are listed in Table I .
Remark 1 (The Appropriateness of Gamma Distribution for Modeling MRI): It can be noticed in
(3) that T R → ∞ if μ r → 0 and T R → 0 if μ r → ∞.
III. BOUNDS OF NEP AND SOR
During the vulnerable period, i.e. t c , user data and signaling packets exchanged between the UE and eNodeB are exposed to eavesdroppers. An approach to mitigate desynchronisation attacks during an MME handover is to minimize the number of exposed packets (NEP) between two root key updates. However, such reduced NEP is achieved at a cost of higher signaling overhead rate (SOR) in terms of the number of bits for authentication. In this section, the NEP and SOR are first analyzed to show their impacts on the security of the MME handover. Their contradictory behaviors are then deduced, which leads to the development of optimization problems in Sections V and VI. The average NEP, i.e. E[N ], and the average SOR, i.e. E [S] , can be expressed as in [8] , i.e.
8 Exponential distribution is used to model the KUI due to its memoryless property in describing the time interval between events which occur independently with a constant rate [37] , [38] . 9 Gamma distribution has been shown to be a good approximation for the cell residence time distribution considering user mobility in cellular networks [39] . where λ p is the mean arrival rate of packets exchanged between the UE and eNodeB; and ρ is the number of bits in the messages for individual authentication among the UEs, the MME and the home subscriber server/authentication center.
In order to provide the insightful meanings of the above expressions, let us derive the limits of the average NEP and SOR as the average root KUI T U and MRI T R approach 0 and ∞. The findings are presented in the following three lemmas: 
Proof: See Appendix A.
Lemma 2: The average NEP, i.e. E[N ], is an increasing function of T R ∈ (0, ∞), which is upper bounded by
while it is lower bounded by
Lemma 3: The average SOR, i.e. E[S]
, is a decreasing function of both T U ∈ (0, ∞) and T R ∈ (0, ∞), in which both are lower bounded by 0, while they are upper bounded by
Proof: From (5), it can be shown that E[S] decreases as either 
Similarly, when
This completes the proof. Lemmas 1, 2 and 3 indicate that reducing either the KUI or MRI lowers the risk of security breaches, i.e. reducing NEPs, at the cost of an increase in signaling overhead. Hence, minimizing the average NEP over either T U or T R is contradicting with minimizing the average SOR. In Section V, we introduce a method to find optimal values of T U and T R in order to balance between the two conflicting objectives.
IV. ANALYSIS OF OUTAGE PROBABILITY
OF VULNERABILITY Apart from analyzing NEP and SOR as in Section III, it is critical to investigate the security of MME handover. This section analyses the OPV of the key update and MME residence management processes. Here, the OPV is defined as the probability that the handover is harmed by desynchronisation attacks, i.e. when the vulnerable period of the handover is longer than a threshold value. Letting P o denote the OPV of the handover process, we have
where t c is a vulnerable period and τ th is a vulnerable interval threshold. 10 As described in Section II, t c = min{t u , t r }, where
The OPV in (13) can be computed by
Note that the KUI, i.e. t U , and MRI, i.e. t R , are given by t U = τ 3 − τ 1 and t R = τ 4 − τ 1 . Therefore, t c can also be 10 The vulnerable interval threshold τ th is set according to the practical handover requirement in different network models to maintain its security against desynchronisation attacks. For example, a small τ th should be considered for a dense network where desynchronisation attacks are likely to occur. determined by min{t U , t R } and (14) can be rewritten using order statistics as
where 
Proof: When k is a positive integer, the gamma function and upper incomplete gamma function in (16) 
Substituting (18) 1, 2, 3 and 4) . In other words, either a short and frequent KUI or a short MRI causes a waste of signaling overhead, but helps reduce the risk of security breaches with small NEP and OPV. This essentially becomes a constrained optimization problem of finding optimal values of T U and T R in order to balance between the NEP and the SOR subject to the constraint of the OPV. 11 The optimization also holds for the key update rate μu since T U is inversely proportional to μu (see (2)).
We first bring the average NEP and SOR into the same scale by defining the following normalized functions max are derived in Section III by (6) , (9), (7) and (10), respectively. We can thus rewrite (20) and (21) as (23), on the bottom of the next page, and
respectively. Finding an optimal x that minimizes both functions S(x) and N (x) is actually solving the following bi-objective optimization problem [16] :
where α denotes the required maximum OPV to guarantee the handover security and P o (x), x ∈ {T U , T R }, is given by (16) in Lemma 4. Note that optimizing the KUI and MRI are two separate optimization problems of T U and T R , respectively. Here, for brevity, we have grouped these two problems into one as shown in (24) when x = T U or x = T R . Specifically, considering the scenario that the shape parameter of the gamma distribution of the MRI, i.e. k, is a positive integer number, P o (x) can be determined using Corollary 1 as follows
From Lemmas 1, 2 and 3, it can be verified that S(x) and N (x) are also decreasing and increasing functions, respectively, with respect to x. Those properties stimulate us to scalarize the proposed MO problem (24) by forming an achievement function [16, Definition 4.28] 
the ratio of the normalized NEP to the normalized SOR. It will be shown latter in this section that adopting the achievement-function method leads to a simple numerical approach using the derived bounds of the NEP and SOR. From (23) and (22), ν(x) can be written by (27) , on the bottom of next page. Furthermore, let us denote δ as the relative importance factor determined by the network operator as the ratio of the average NEP to SOR. 12 The MO problem in (24) can be transformed into the following SO problem to find the optimal solution x while balancing the two conflicting objectives and satisfying the OPV constraint (see (25) ).
In fact, problem (28) is also a FP. According to [16, Theorem 4.29] , the optimal solution to the FP (28) is also the optimal solution to the original MO problem (24) . Solving the above optimization problem, we have the following boundary-based FP problem:
Lemma 5 (FP Method): The optimal T U and T R can be obtained as follows
where x ∈ {T U , T R } and x max is found by solving P o (x) = α. Proof: It can be shown that ν(x), x ∈ {T U , T R }, is an increasing function with respect to x since S(x) and N (x) are decreasing and increasing functions, respectively, over x. The optimal solution to (28), i.e. x opt , can be thus obtained by solving the equation ν(x) = δ where ν(x) is given by (27) . Additionally, as noted in Remark 2, the OPV increases as either the KUI or the MRI increases, i.e. P o (x) increases over x. Therefore, given the constraint (30) on the required maximum OPV, we can determine the maximum value of x, i.e. x max , by solving P o (x) = α where P o (x) is given by (26) . This accordingly means that in order to guarantee the OPV requirement, the optimal values of the KUI and MRI should also not exceed these maximum values. The Lemma is proved.
Corollary 2: The optimal value x opt in (31) can be found only when 0 < δ ≤ δ max , where δ max = ν(x max ) and
Proof: The proof can be straightforwardly obtained with the notice from Lemma 5 that ν(x) monotonically increases over x and with the constraint x ≤ x max .
Remark 3 (Impacts of Relative Important Factor Between NEP and SOR): It can be noticed that, if
δ → 0, then solving (31), i.e. ν(x) → 0, means N (x) → 0 and S(x) → 1.
Similarly, if δ → ∞, then we need to solve ν(x) → ∞, i.e. S(x)
→ 0 and N (x) → 1. Furthermore, from Corollary 2, the relative important factor should be restricted in a specific range, i.e. δ ∈ (0, δ max ], which can be determined through the OPV constraint.
For clarity, the finding of the optimal KUI and MRI with the proposed boundary-based FP is summarized in Algorithm 1.
In order to examine the practicality of the proposed FP algorithm, let us consider the following example:
Example 1: A UE experiences intra-MME handover with the following parameters: the mean packet arrival rate 12 Lowering the signaling overheads beyond a certain point increases the risk of other attacks on the network entities. By varying the important factor δ, the Pareto frontier for the proposed MO problem can be attained. Hence, the operator/decision maker can select a suitable operation point from the Pareto frontier satisfying the required value of signaling overhead. where ν(x) is given by (27) 4: Determine x max : P o (x max ) = α (see Lemma 5) 5: where 
seconds and 2.4 seconds when the duration that the UE stays within an MME, i.e. MRI, is 6 seconds and 8 seconds, respectively.
A graphical illustration of the relationship between the normalized NEP and the normalized SOR is shown in Fig. 2 . In Fig. 2 Fig. 2(b) with respect to various μ r and k. As stated in Lemma 5, for every value of δ, the optimal values of T R and T U are the crossing points between the line S(x) = N (x)/δ and the curve S(N (T R )) and S(N (T U )) in Figs. 2(a) and 2(b), respectively. Also, these illustrations verify the notice in Remark 3 as δ approaches either 0 or ∞.
(a), S(T R ) is plotted versus N (T R ), while S(T U ) is plotted versus N (T U ) in
Remark 4 (Reduced complexity via FP approach): It can be observed that, by deriving the bounds of the average NEP and the average SOR in Section III, the optimization problem in (28) can be easily solved by a numerical method. Specifically, the proposed FP approach can provide optimal KUI and MRI by solving two equations, as stated in Lemma 5, rather than performing exhaustive searches as in the conventional approach, e.g. [8] . This not only helps reduce the 
. S(T R ) versus N (T R ) with T U = 3 seconds; S(T U ) versus N (T U )
with ρ = 1 kbits and λp = 64 kbits/s. complexity in finding the optimal solutions, but also improves the reliability with numerical approach, which accordingly reflects the novelty of our work in finding the bounds for the NEP and SOR in Section III.
VI. FIREFLY ALGORITHM FOR OPTIMIZING KUI & MRI
In this section, we adopt a popular weighted-sum method to scalarize the MO problem into an SO problem. To that end, the scalarized version of the MO problem (24) can be formulated as the following SO problem: (27) where w 1 and w 2 are weighting factors satisfying w 1 + w 2 = 1.
13 For convenience, let us denote the value set of (T U , T R ) by (x, y) which can be regarded as spatial coordinates of a point in 2D. From (23), (22) and (26) with a notice that μ r = k/T R , we can rewrite the objective (32) and constraint (33) by replacing x = T U and y = T R as follows:
According to [16, Theorem 3.11] , the optimal solution to the SO problem (34) is also the optimal solution to the MO problem (24) . Given preferential information of w 1 and w 2 , it is very challenging to derive a numerical method to solve the above SO problem (34) . Fortunately, nature-inspired metaheuristic algorithms can be exploited to obtain the optimal solution. Specifically, FA has recently emerged as one of the powerful biologically inspired algorithms to solve various optimization problems [42] by offering more naturally and efficiently environmental awareness in decision making and learning processes. Although there are various evolutionary algorithms to deal with diverse optimization problems [43] , such as genetic algorithm [44] , [45] , ant colony optimization algorithm [46] , [47] , particle swarm optimization algorithm [48] , [49] , etc., the FA is shown to be more natural and efficient compared to the other counterparts [42] . It is noted that FA has been proposed to cope with the MO problems in various applications, for instance, pressure vessel design [50] , flowshop scheduling problems [51] , economic emissions load dispatch problems [52] , structural optimization [53] and telecommunications [54] . Due to the above facts, the FA is exploited in this work to solve the proposed problem (34) . In the following, the FA is briefly introduced, followed by its adaptation for the MO problem under investigation.
A. Firefly Algorithm (FA)
Fireflies, a.k.a. lightning bugs, produce short and rhythmic flashing lights to not only attract mating partners and potential preys, but also help in defensive vigilance. With about 2000 species of fireflies, the pattern of their flashes is unique for different species with different flashing rate and duration. By observing the fundamental functions of the flashes and their light intensity at various distances, the flashing light can be formulated to model the objective function which can be solved with FA.
In order to describe the FA, for simplicity, the flashing characteristics of fireflies are firstly idealized as follows [42] : 13 By varying the weighting factors w 1 and w 2 , the Pareto frontier for the proposed MO problem can be attained. From the Pareto frontier, the operator/decision maker can select a suitable operation point satisfying the required value of signaling overhead to eliminate the risk of other attacks on the network entities. i) All the fireflies are unisex and thus can attract each other irrespective of their sex; ii) Attractiveness of the fireflies is proportional to their brightness, while inversely proportional to the distance between them; iii) The brightness of a firefly is affected by the topography of the objective function. For a maximization problem, the brightness is simply proportional to the objective function value, while for a minimization problem, the brightness can be represented by the reciprocal of the objective function value. It is noted that the light intensity received at a specific node of distance r with respect to a light source varies as
where I 0 is the original light intensity of the source and γ is the light absorption coefficient which is dependent on the transmission medium assumed to be fixed. According to the second rule of the FA, the attractiveness of a firefly i with respect to a firefly j can be similarly formulated as follows
where β 0 is the attractiveness at r ij = 0 and the distance between a firefly i at (x i , y i ) and a firefly j at (x j , y j ) is determined by the Euclidean distance as
Additionally, the random movement of a firefly j towards a more attractive firefly i is modeled as [42] 
where U x and U y are uniformly distributed random numbers in the interval (0, 1) and ϕ is randomization parameter which is assumed to vary in (0, 1].
B. Optimizing KUI & MRI With FA
Adopting the FA approach in solving the MO problem in (34), the light intensity of a firefly at (x, y) is represented by the reciprocal of the objective function, 14 i.e. (41) Let N F and G max denote the number of fireflies and their maximum generation, respectively. The FA approach for finding the optimal KUI and MRI subject to the constraint on the OPV is carried out as in Algorithm 2.
I(x, y)
= w 1 1 − x y 1 − kx kx + y k + w 2 x x + y −1
Algorithm 2 (Firefly Algorithm)
Determine the light intensity at all fireflies {I i (x i , y i )}, i = 1, 2, . . . , N F , using (41) 4: repeat 5: for i = 1 to N F do 6: for j = i + 1 to N F do 7: if I j > I i then 8: Move firefly i towards firefly j with new position (x i , y i ) (see (39) and (40)) 9:
Update attractiveness between fireflies (see (37)) 11: Update light intensity at fireflies w.r.t. new position 12: x opt = x i , y opt = y i 13:
Move firefly i back to the original position 15: end if 16: end if 17: end for 18 : end for 19: Rank all fireflies in ascending order of their light intensity 
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we first present numerical results of three performance metrics, including NEP, SOR and OPV, followed by the optimization of the KUI and MRI for the handover security key management using FP and FA approaches. The values of typical parameters used in the numerical evaluations are provided in Table II unless otherwise stated. 
A. The Impacts of KUI and MRI on NEP Performance
rate of packets exchanged between the UE and eNodeB is λ p = 64 kbits/s. In Fig. 3(a) , various scenarios of T R ∈ {6, 8, 10, 12} seconds in respect of the variants of mobility rate μ r ∈ {1/6, 1/8, 1/10, 1/12} given a fixed shape parameter k = 1, while in Fig. 3(b) , T U is assumed to be in {2, 4, 6, 8} seconds. The upper bounds are plotted using (6) and (7) derived in Lemmas 1 and 2, respectively. It can be observed in both Figs. 3(a) and 3(b) that all the simulation results approach the derived bounds and the average NEP increases as either T U or T R increases.
Moreover, considering the scenario of a very small shape parameter of gamma distribution, i.e. k → 0, Fig. 4 shows another illustration of the average NEP as a function of the MRI with respect to various values of k ∈ {0.02, 0.05, 0.1}. The KUI is set as 2 seconds and other parameters are similarly set as in Fig. 3(b) . It can be observed in Fig. 4 that all the NEP curves are lower bounded by (8) and such bound is Fig. 5(a) , while in Fig. 5(b) , T U is set in {2, 4, 6, 8} seconds. The number of bits for authentication between entities in the network is set as ρ = 1000 bits. It can be seen that the average SOR decreases to 0 as either T U or T R increases and they are all bounded by (9) and (10) when T U and T R approach to 0, respectively. These verify the findings in Lemma 3 about the monotonic decrease property of E[S] over T U and T R .
C. The Outage Probability of Vulnerability
Analysing the secrecy performance of MMI handover, Fig. 6 shows the OPV, i.e. P o as a function of vulnerable interval threshold, i.e. τ th . Specifically, with regard to the KUI and MRI, we assume that T U varies in {2, 4, 6, 8} seconds and T R = 8 seconds in Fig. 6(a) , while T R ∈ {6, 8, 10, 12} seconds and T U = 3 seconds in Fig. 6(b) . It can be observed in these figures that an improved performance with a lower OPV is achieved when either the KUI or the MRI is short, which accordingly verifies the statement in Remark 2. Additionally, the analytical results in Lemma 4 with the closed-form expression (17) in Corollary 1 are shown to be consistent with the simulation results. 
D. Optimal KUI and MRI With FP Approach
In order to find the optimal KUI and MRI that minimize the NEP and SOR subject to OPV constraint, as stated in Lemma 5, we first find the maximal T U and T R . Figs. 7(a) and 7(b) plot the maximal T U , i.e. T U,max , and maximal T R , i.e. T R,max , respectively, as the functions of the vulnerable interval threshold, i.e. τ th , with respect to two scenarios of OPV constraint α ∈ {0.01, 0.001}. In these two subfigures, T U,max and T R,max are determined by solving P o (x) = α where x ∈ {T U , T R } and P o (x) is given by (26) . It can be observed that, in order to achieve a stricter OPV requirement with a lower α, either a shorter KUI or MRI is required. This is also reflected from the observation in Fig. 6 . Also, in Fig. 7(a) , T U,max is shown to decrease as T R increases. This is due to the fact that an increased T R causes a higher OPV and thus T U should be reduced to achieve the required OPV.
Given the maximal KUI and MRI in Fig. 7 subject to the constraint on the OPV, Figs. 8(a) and 8(b) sequentially plot the optimal values of T U and T R , i.e. T U,opt and T R,opt , versus the relative importance ratio between NEP and SOR, i.e. δ, using the proposed FP approach. For comparison, an exhaustive search approach in [8] is included in Fig. 8 . In this exhaustive search approach, a running step size of 0.05 second is assumed, while in the FP approach, by exploiting the bounds of E[N ] and E [S] in Figs. 3 and 5 , the normalized NEP and SOR can be determined, and thus the optimal T R and T U , i.e. T R,opt and T U,opt , can be solved numerically by (31) in Lemma 5. It is assumed that the target maximum OPV is α = 0.01 and the vulnerable interval threshold is τ th = 5 seconds. As shown in Corollary 2, it is necessary to determine the condition of δ to meet the OPV requirement. Therefore, in Figs. 8(a) and 8(b) , the maximal δ, i.e. δ max , is also illustrated for various scenarios of T U and T R .
In Figs. 8(a) and 8(b) , it can be seen that T R,opt and T U,opt increase as δ increases up to δ max . In fact, a higher NEP is required over the SOR to achieve a higher δ. This means the security is of lower priority compared to the signaling overhead. Therefore, the optimal intervals T U,opt and T R,opt must be long enough to provide a lower 
E. Optimal KUI and MRI With FA Approach
Considering the minimization of the weighted sum of NEP and SOR as shown in (32), we implement FA approach in MATLAB. Note that finding the optimal KUI and MRI is equivalent to finding x and y to maximize the light intensity in FA, i.e. reciprocal of the weighted sum (see (41) ). Fig. 9 illustrates the 3-D shaded surface plot of the reciprocal of the weighted sum, i.e. I(T U , T R ). It is assumed that T U and T R vary in the range [1, 8] seconds. Let us consider 20 fireflies, i.e. N F = 20, flying in a 2-D coordinate grid in which the coordinates (x, y) of the fireflies correspond to the values of T U and T R to be optimised.
In order to illustrate the operation of the FA in solving the MO problem, Fig. 10 plots the location of 20 fireflies at different stages/generations. The FA is carried out as in Algorithm 2 where the randomization parameter, the light absorption coefficient and the maximum generation are set as ϕ = 0.3, γ = 1 and G max = 50, respectively. Specifically, in Fig. 10(a) , the initial population of fireflies are generated over the 2-D grid with a notice that their location should satisfy the OPV constraint (35) where the target maximum OPV and the vulnerable interval threshold are α = 0.01 and τ th = 5 seconds, respectively. It can be observed in Fig. 10(b) that the fireflies can quickly aggregate in a dense group after only 5 iterations and the optimal location of the firefly having the maximum light intensity can be found after 50 iterations as shown in Fig. 10(c) . Table III where α ∈ {0.1, 0.01} and τ th ∈ {4, 5, 6, 7, 8} seconds. For fair comparison, it is assumed that δ = 1 in FP method and w 1 = w 2 = 0.5 in FA method. The FA is first implemented to find the optimal KUIs and MRIs in different scenarios. Then, for each value of the obtained KUI with the FA, we implement the FP method to find the corresponding optimal MRI. It can be seen that the optimal MRIs are different with 2 approaches; however, they both result in a closed weighted sum of NEP and SOR, i.e. f (T U , T R ). It is also shown in Table III that both the FP and FA approaches require shorter KUI and MRI for a target OPV, i.e. α, as the vulnerable interval threshold, i.e. τ th , decreases. This is due to the fact that a lower τ th results in a higher OPV (see Fig. 6 ), and thus, as noted in Remark 2, a shorter KUI and MRI are required to reduce the OPV to achieve its target. Notice that the optimal values in the FA are found so as to minimize the weighted sum of two objectives, while those in the FP are for minimizing the fraction of these two objectives. The above observations accordingly verify the effectiveness of the FA in finding the optimal KUIs and MRIs to minimize the weighted sum of two objectives with high reliability and quick convergence.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, OPV has been derived along with the bounds of NEP and SOR to not only facilitate the normalization functions in the optimization problem but also characterize the monotonicity properties of the NEP, SOR and OPV over the KUI and MRI. It has been shown that the NEP and SOR are respectively increasing and decreasing functions of both the KUI and MRI, while either a short KUI or MRI helps reduce the OPV for an enhanced handover security.
Aiming at minimizing the NEP and SOR while still maintaining the OPV constraint, an MO problem has been introduced to find the optimal KUI and MRI to balance these two conflicting objectives. Since there is no single solution to the MO problem with conflicting objectives, it is critical to combine these two objectives into a single objective. Specifically, we have considered two approaches where the objectives can be expressed in the form of either a fraction or a weighted sum.
In the FP approach, the MO problem has been converted to an SO problem where the optimal solutions can be found via a simple numerical method, while in the FA approach, the MO problem has been considered as the minimization of the weighted sum of the NEP and SOR. Both approaches have shown to provide a lower complexity rather than performing heuristic exhaustive searches. In particular, a quick convergence can be achieved with the FA when the fireflies move quickly towards the optimal values after a small number of generations, and thus is promising to provide a self-adjusting and fast MME handover with enhanced security and lower complexity in practice. A possible extension of this work is to investigate the practical issues of the MME handover key management when employing the proposed approaches to cope with the desynchronisation attacks. 
The upper bound of E[N ] can be computed by applying L'Hospital's Rule when T U → ∞, i.e. μ u → 0. Let us define
Substituting (43) and (44) into (4), we have
We continue by calculating f 1 (μ u ) as follows:
where
Substituting (46) into (45), we then have
Similarly, we can arrive at
Finally, we obtain
Equivalently, (42) and (55) 
ii) k → 0: we have T R → 0 and
where f 6 (μ r ) has the same form as f 5 (k) in (60) and g 6 (μ r ) = 1/μ r .
It can be seen that f 6 (μ r ) → 0 and g 6 (μ r ) → 0 as μ r → ∞. Similarly, using the L'Hospital's Rule, we can show that N (TR) min = 0 as μ r → ∞. Summarizing the above cases, the Lemma is proved.
APPENDIX C PROOF OF LEMMA 4 As described in Section II, the KUI, i.e. t U , is modeled by an exponential distribution with a rate of μ u and the MRI, i.e. t R , is described by a gamma distribution with a shape parameter of k and a rate of μ r . The cdfs of t U and t R are given by [38] F tU (x) = 1 − e −μux (64)
respectively, where Γ(z) 
The Lemma is proved.
